Expand description
An agent process must not hold the account’s cloud login.
The srv used to put the user’s muxbus access token in every agent’s env
(MUXBUS_TOKEN, with MUXBUS_COGNITO_DOMAIN). Nothing in AgentMux reads
it there: the srv makes every cloud call with its own stored login, and
agents reach the cloud through the srv. What the variable did give an
agent is the power to act as the account: publish WAN keys for an install
it made up and sign jekts as any agent name, which then verify
(SPEC_WAN_JEKT_VERIFICATION_2026_09_24.md §6.4). That is why a verified
WAN sender couldn’t be trusted without a human approving its install.
strip_account_login is called on every path that spawns an agent
process, next to gh_guard::apply_gh_guard, and removes the variables
wherever they came from — a persisted cmd:env from before this change,
or a caller’s override. Like GH_CONFIG_DIR, they are reserved.
Limit: agents run as the same OS user as the srv, so one that goes looking can still read the srv’s stored login from disk (§6.5). This takes the login out of the agent’s hands by default; it is not an OS boundary.
Constants§
- ACCOUNT_
LOGIN_ VARS - The account-login variables no agent env may carry.
Functions§
- strip_
account_ login - Remove every
ACCOUNT_LOGIN_VARSentry fromenv_vars.