Expand description
Per-agent Ed25519 keypair for LAN-tier jekt sender verification. See db_agent_lan_keys in migrations.rs (OBJECT_SCHEMA_VERSION v19) and docs/specs/SPEC_JEKT_LAN_TIER_SIGNING_2026_08_15.md §2.1.
Mirrors agent_jekt_keys.rs exactly, asymmetric instead of symmetric: one
row per locally-registered agent_id, minted once (first call to
agent_lan_key_ensure) and never leaves this srv instance except by the
PRIVATE half being injected into that ONE agent’s own MCP server process
env (AGENTMUX_LAN_KEY) — never into any other agent’s env, and never
returned over any RPC. The public half is not secret — it’s what gets
handed to LAN peers on request (see LanDiscovery::find_agent_lan_pubkey)
so they can verify this agent’s outgoing signatures.
Structs§
- Agent
LanKeypair - An agent’s LAN signing keypair, both halves base64-encoded for storage/transport.
Functions§
- random_
seed_ 🔒bytes - 32 bytes of randomness via two v4 UUIDs, for every key table in this
module (LAN, WAN, jekt, WAN identity) and the agent tokens. Avoids adding a
rand/getrandomdependency:uuid’s v4 generation is already CSPRNG-backed, anded25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytesaccepts any 32 bytes of randomness as a valid seed (deterministic derivation from the seed, not a call into an RNG itself).