Struct VerifySenderVerdict 

pub struct VerifySenderVerdict {
    pub name: String,
    pub status: &'static str,
    pub tier: Option<&'static str>,
    pub last_seen_ms: Option<i64>,
    pub channel: Option<String>,
    pub local_url: Option<String>,
}

Not a security/trust primitive. This reports registry LIVENESS only (does an agent named X currently exist in the discovery data at all) — it performs NO cryptographic check and must not be confused with the actual JEKT sender-authentication mechanism, which is per-message, automatic, and already computes a real TRUST=/SIG= value on every delivered jekt via HMAC-SHA256 (host tier) / Ed25519 (LAN tier) / a pinned Ed25519 key (reagent WAN) — see this repo’s root CLAUDE.md, “Is a jekt’s sender identity actually verified? — the real answer”. Earlier drafts of this route reused that exact vocabulary (host-verified/network-claimed) for a mere presence check, which collided with — and could be mistaken for — that real, stronger guarantee (reagentx-workflow review on PR #2702, P1). Deliberately no trust/verified field here at all: status + tier fully describe what was actually checked (presence, not authenticity), with nothing that could be misread as more than that.

Fields

name: String

status: &'static str

"found" | "not_found" | "stale".

tier: Option<&'static str>

last_seen_ms: Option<i64>

channel: Option<String>

local_url: Option<String>

Trait Implementations

impl Debug for VerifySenderVerdict

fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result

Formats the value using the given formatter.

impl Eq for VerifySenderVerdict

impl PartialEq for VerifySenderVerdict

fn eq(&self, other: &VerifySenderVerdict) -> bool

Equality operator ==.

fn ne(&self, other: &Rhs) -> bool

Inequality operator !=.

impl Serialize for VerifySenderVerdict

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.

impl StructuralPartialEq for VerifySenderVerdict